When we look into the New Testament, we find, even in it, many things respecting the nature, origin, and ends of civil government, the qualifications, duties, and claims of civil rulers, and the obligations of subjects toward magistrates both supreme and subordinate. For what purpose, we ask, are these placed in the sacred volume, surely not to be overlooked, but to be read, pondered, and obeyed? They are certainly designed to be of use, but this they cannot be if nations as such, and men in their civil capacity, are not under their authority as parts of revealed truth. When therefore we find civil rulers, kings, and judges commanded to be wise and to be instructed, must we not understand them as required to go to the Bible for the instruction they need, and to extract from this sacred repository their lessons of political wisdom? It thus appears satisfactorily established that nations are under the obligation of the revealed will of Christ in general, and bound to regulate their transactions by it, in as far as it contains what is applicable to such, whether in the form of principle, precept, or example. And if this is the case with regard to revelation as a whole, it will not be denied to be so with regard to the moral law in particular. Nations, as such, are under the obligation of the moral law, They are bound to regulate their affairs by the principles and precepts of the decalogue. Every precept of that law they are bound to obey. It is, we are aware, maintained that only the precepts of the second table are obligatory on civil communities. As an individual standing in a particular relation and circumstances is not under obligation to obey those parts of revelation which have respect to persons placed in other relations and circumstances, so it is contended that nations are only under the obligation of such parts of the moral law as can be shown to apply to them. We frankly admit the fairness of this reasoning. But then we are prepared to maintain that every part of the moral law is applicable to nations. If nations in their national capacity and magistrates in their official character are admitted to be moral subjects, it will not be easy to show that they are exempt from the obligation of any part of the moral law. If it could be shown that there are some requirements in that law which nations are incompetent to fulfill, it would follow, of course, that from these they are exempted. If, however, it can be shown that nations are capable of obeying every precept, those of the first as well as those of the second table of the law, it will be difficult to persuade an unprejudiced mind that they are free from the obligation of any one of them. With regard to the second table, there is, of course, no dispute. Yet the last precept of this department reaches farther than many of those who contend against all national religion can consistently go. It respects the state of the heart. But it may easily be shown that nations are as capable of obeying the precepts of the first as those of the second table. How is it, we ask, that nations can obey even the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments, but just by passing laws obliging men to perform their respective relative duties, by protecting the life and property of individuals, by discouraging licentiousness, and by promoting truth between man and man by the sanctity of an oath? And may they not, in like manner, manifest their obedience to the first, second, third, and fourth precepts by embodying into their constitution an acknowledgment of the being and character of the one living and true God, by providing for the ordinances of divine worship being maintained and observed in the land, by enacting laws calculated to restrain all blasphemous abuse of God's sacred name, and by making provision for the sanctification of the Sabbath, And if nations are thus capable of obeying the whole moral law, who will contend that they are not under obligation to do so? We allow that the scriptures of truth are necessary to guide them in yielding this obedience, but is not this true of the one table as much as of the other? The kingdoms of the world require, indeed, much direction from the word of God in performing the solemn and delicate duties obligatory upon them by the first table of the moral law. But do they require no such direction with regard to those of the second? They do. The law of marriage belongs to the fifth commandment. But how, with having recourse to other portions of the scriptures, can any Christian nation legislate against polygamy? The law of murder is founded on the sixth. And how, without betaking to some other part of revealed truth, can it be shown that the murderer should be punished with death? It thus appears that nations as such are bound to recognize the obligation of the word of God as a whole, to make it their rule in all their transactions and their standard of appeal in all circumstances, and in this way to show their dutiful subjection to that divine mediator who is at once the author of revelation and the governor among the nations. Thirdly, it is a duty which nations owe to Messiah the Prince to have respect to moral and religious qualifications in those whom they appoint over them. We wait not to agitate the question of the people's right to elect their own office bearers. Whatever diversity of opinion may prevail regarding the First Magistrate, there is now no dispute, at least in these lands, with regard to the right of election in the legislative and executive departments of government. The general practice of the nations unites with scripture and common sense in support of a representative system of government. Rulers, as the representatives of the people, are understood to be elected by and responsible to the people according to the constitution and laws of the land. Even under the Old Testament dispensation, when kings were designated to office by immediate revelation, the consent of the people was deemed indispensable to their lawful authority, and they were liable to removal from office by the people for abuse of their trust. With regard to subordinate office bearers also, such directions were given as clearly imply that the right of election belonged to the community. Take ye wise men and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you. When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from among thy brethren, and shalt thou set king over thee. Thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother." and Deuteronomy 17 verses 14 and 15. But is it to be supposed that the people who are invested with the right of election are left without all control in the exercise of this right? That they are at liberty, acting for mere prejudice, self-interest, or caprice, to choose whom they will, and that the objects of their choice are forthwith, in consequence of being so chosen, invested with lawful and indisputable authority? So far from this being the case, the people are bound to use their elective power discreetly and wisely. They are under obligation to fix upon men possessed of qualifications fitting them for office. Nor are they themselves constituted the sole judges of what these qualifications may be. God has given them in His word a supreme rule of direction, in which the character of civil rulers is described, and only such as seem to them to be possessed of this character are they at liberty to appoint. If the people were under no restriction of this nature, it is fearful to think of the consequences that would ensue, as the power of the magistrate is not an absolute power which he is at liberty to employ as he chooses, so neither is the right of the elector an absolute right which he is at liberty to exercise as he chooses. Both the one and the other are placed under the limiting control of the divine law, and it is only when they are used according to this law that they are used aright. It is not every individual who is qualified to hold office in a nation. Good natural talents, a cultivated mind, and a due share of acquaintance with the principles of government and with the constitution and laws of the country seem indispensable. Scripture, not less than common sense, discounts the practice of setting persons of feeble intellect to bear rule. Woe unto thee, O land, when thy king is a child, says Scripture, thou shalt provide out of all the people able men. Take ye wise men and understanding, and I will make them rulers over you. Not less essential are moral qualifications. High and incorruptible integrity. Well-regulated mercy, strict veracity, and exemplary temperance are all specified with approbation in the Word of God. Moreover, thou shalt provide out of all the people men of truth, hating covetousness. He that ruleth over men must be just. Mercy and truth preserve the king, and his throne is upholden by mercy. If a ruler hearkened to lies, all his servants are wicked. It is not for kings, O Lemuel, it is not for kings to drink wine, nor for princes strong drink, lest they drink, and forget the law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted. See Exodus 18.21, 2 Samuel 23.3, Proverbs 20.28, 31.4, 5. Nay, more than this, religious qualifications are required in Scripture. A profession of religion would seem to be implied in the canon. One from among thy brethren shalt thou set over thee, thou mayest not set a stranger over thee who is not thy brother. Deuteronomy 17.15 But true religion in the soul is also specified. Thou shalt provide out of all the people such as fear God, saith Scripture. He that ruleth over men must be just, ruling in the fear of God. See Exodus 18.21, 2 Samuel 23.3. It is needless to say that the fear of God is spoken of in Scripture as the very essence and sum of true piety. The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom. Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not depart from me." Thus it appears that three distinct classes of qualifications are necessary in civil rulers, natural, moral, and religious. They are required to be men of good abilities, of unimpeachable character, and of sound piety. Weak and ignorant men, drunkards, libertines, Sabbath-breakers, profane swearers, papists, Sassinians, infidels, are accordingly disqualified for exercising government in a country which is blessed with the volume of revelation. Such the people are not at liberty to appoint to places of power and trust. As regards the two former classes of qualifications, namely such as are natural and moral, The statement will not, perhaps, be disputed by many who will demur to it as regards the third, that is, religious qualifications. The word of God, however, is as explicit on this point as on the others. And if it is asked of what use is religion to a civil ruler, it might be deemed enough in reply to refer the objector to the Bible, where such qualifications are expressly required. But no one who candidly reflects that civil magistrates are denominated ministers of God in Scripture that they are required to administer oaths, that they exert a mighty influence by their example, and that decided personal piety adds greatly to the luster and power even of natural and moral qualities, can be at a loss to perceive the importance of religion to one who is invested with civil power. It will be allowed, then, that the nations owe it as a duty to Messiah their prince to appoint over them rulers possessed of such qualifications as his word prescribes. What these qualifications are, we have already seen. And it requires but a slight glance at the state of things, even among those nations which are in possession of the inspired volume, to perceive how utterly and how extensively this duty is disregarded. It is a too common maxim with many in our day that magistrates as such have nothing to do with religion. Nothing to do with it, it would seem, not only as an object of legislation, but even as a qualification for office. How often does it happen that men of any religion, or of no religion at all, are unblushingly preferred to those who have justly acquired a reputation for godliness? How dishonoring to Christ thus to set up as His ministers, His open and avowed enemies, men who deny His divinity, who blaspheme His name, who deride His worship, and who openly profane His sacred day. Such conduct is attempted to be justified on a principle which is alike pernicious and fallacious, namely, that we have nothing to do with the private character of public men. Apart from the divinely authorized maxim that the wicked walk on every side when the vilest men are exalted, a maxim which all history illustrates, if rulers are required, as we have shown, to respect the glory of Christ and to take His laws as their rule, it is impossible that their moral and religious qualifications can be a matter of indifference. For without such qualifications they cannot perform any one of these duties. However the force of circumstances and the overruling providence of God may compel men of no private worth to devise and execute measures of public utility, there can be no security for either the existence or efficient execution of such measures when the public offices are filled with worthless men. And even if there were, this would not prove it to be the duty of Christians to confer the highest honors of state on persons of this description, and that too in preference to men of distinguished private worth. How differently did the patriotic Nehemiah feel and act in this matter? In Nehemiah chapter 7 verse 2 he says, I gave Hananiah, ruler of the palace, charge over Jerusalem, for he was a faithful man and feared God above many. The senseless outcry of measures, not men, may serve the purpose of the slavish adherence of a profligate ministry, but it is a maxim that is essentially based on manly, irrational, and un-Christian. It overlooks the necessary connection subsisting between cause and effect. It pours contempt on those parts of revelation in which the qualifications of rulers are prescribed. and it manifests an utter disregard of the honor and glory of the Savior. The maxim, Measures, not Men, is not more deserving of respect than its converse, Men, not Measures. Indeed, if we were under an absolute necessity of choosing either the one or the other, we should not hesitate to prefer the latter, there being, in our opinion, a much greater likelihood of good men correcting the evils of bad measures than of good measures restraining the evils of bad men. But there is no need for adopting either. With the Bible in our hands, we are entitled to insist on both. Measures and men, or rather, men and measures, is the maximum which Christian nations should proceed. And every people, duly allied to their obligations, by making it an unalterable and fundamental law that they shall set over them only able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness, of terror to evildoers, and of praise to them that do well, will take care so as to frame their constitution and regulate their practice, that the openly vicious and ungodly shall not have it in their power to thrust themselves into the sanctuaries of law and justice. Nor is it only to the qualifications of the rulers whom they choose that, out of respect to the will and glory of Christ, men are bound to attend, but also to their own qualifications as electors. This point is too apt to be forgotten. It is, however, one of great importance. Where the elective franchise is liberally enjoyed, everything may be said to depend upon the manner in which it is exercised. Electors, who are themselves irreligious and immoral, are not likely to set a high value on the existence of proper qualifications in those whom they choose to represent them. To such, the absence of these qualities is apt rather to prove a recommendation. But the choice of a representative, it should be borne in mind, is a civil right, the exercise of which involves, to a great extent, the welfare of the nation. It is not the individual himself alone that suffers from improper use of this privilege, but the community at large. It is consequently of immense moment that he exercise it not from passion, fancy, or prejudice, but under the guidance of sound Christian principle. He is bound to subject his judgment and inclinations in this matter to the control of God's word. Hence, the vast importance of having the public mind deeply imbued with moral sentiments and correct religious principles. Never should the professing Christian suffer himself to forget that he is bound to act in character at all times. Never can the circumstance occur which will warrant him to say, Now I may drop the Christian and act the civilian, or the man. It is not in matters of an ecclesiastical nature merely that he is to act as a Christian. He must conduct himself as a Christian at all times, when acting as a member of the state, not less than as a member of the church, in the workshop, as well as in the sanctuary, in the hustings, as well as at the table of our Lord. Fourthly, the nations ought to have respect to Christ in their subjection to those who rule over them by His authority. Scripturally qualified and lawfully constituted magistrates are entitled to conscientious submission. Whatever are the specific duties to which such are entitled, whether respect or tribute or prayer, the duties are to be performed, not from slavish dread or selfish motives, but from respect to the authority and honor of the Redeemer. The law of Christ in this point is very fully and explicitly laid down in an oft-quoted but ill-understood part of New Testament scripture. Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Will thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same, for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience's sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute also, for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor. We say nothing at present of the character of the powers to which subjection is here enjoined. The nature of the subjection is that to which we would first call attention. It is conscientious subjection that is spoken of, free, willing, hardy, not forced or constrained. It is such as supposes the lawfulness of the authorities to which it is paid, and such as recognizes the will of him by whom they act. It is to proceed from respect to the authority in joining obedience, and not from a mere dread of the consequences of disobedience. In this way are the inhabitants of the nations bound to yield to their rulers. Fear, not a slavish, involuntary dread, but an affectionate, respectful, and confident veneration. Well-doing, in the diligent performance of the duties of their station and constant fulfillment of the laws. Tribute, the pecuniary support which is requisite for internal improvements, national defenses, and the maintenance of such functionaries as devote their whole time to the public good, and which is to be paid cheerfully, not merely as a return for privileges enjoyed, but as a mark of submission to and approbation of God's ordinance. Custom, that peculiar form of taxation which falls not directly on persons or land of property, but on goods imported or exported. and honor, in the use of respectful language and demeanor, avoiding on the one hand all scurrilous vilification, and on the other all idolatrous adulation of men in power. These duties are to be performed from the principle of conscience, and the refusal to perform them is denounced and threatened with danger. Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. The resistance of lawful authority is thus stigmatized as rebellion against God, and, according to the views formally laid down, must be regarded as peculiarly offensive to the Messiah. It is obvious, however, that it cannot be to every power without exception that subjection under these lawful sanctions is inculcated. Such a supposition is anything but honoring to Christ. Some indeed have maintained this, and the better to support their views have regarded the apostle in the above passages having immediate respect to the then existing government. This opinion they found on the words, the powers that be, or there is no power. But they overlook the circumstance that similar phraseology is employed in laying down general principles applicable to every age. For example, The verse, There is no man that hath left house, etc., but he shall receive a hundredfold. Here the phrase is the same as when it is said in the passage in question, There is no power but of God. And if the latter is restricted to the then existing authorities, ought not the former to be explained as applying exclusively to the men of the then existing generation? Again we read, There be just men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked, where the mode of expression is the same as in the phrase, The power is the bee. And whoever thought of regarding the sentiment expressed in this passage is peculiar to the time when Solomon wrote. Besides, the laws of impartial criticism require us to explain the character of the powers spoken of by the context, where they are described as not a terror to good works but to evil, ministers of God for good, bearing out the sword in vain, revengers to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. It is only necessary to compare, or rather contrast, these expressions with the character of the then existing powers, to be convinced that the whole passage is descriptive of the duties of Christians towards not any magistrates who may happen to be possessed of power, but such as are what they ought to be. Nero, who at that time wore the purple, was in every respect the opposite of what is here described. He was one of the most wicked monsters that ever occupied a throne, a terror not to evil works, but to good. bearing the sword in opposition to everything that deserved protection and support, and executing wrath only on such as did good and shunned evil. Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. Let Nero be tried by this test. In a footnote, he says, The author has made a reference to Burke's Christian state in support of his argument. The following are some of the sentences. It is objected that the words of St. Paul apply immediately to the Emperor Nero, of whom it is unutterably absurd to suppose that the Apostle meant to invest him with any authority in religion. Hence the application, which is untrue in this case, must be untrue in every other, and no reference to religious authority can possibly be designed. This objection would be forcible and conclusive if the Apostle were merely asserting a fact, but if he is defining the real duty of the ruler, which is evidently the case, it becomes quite powerless. Viewed in the former light, the words would scarcely be true, even when limited to secular affairs, for Nero was often a terror to good works and sometimes more than to evil. St. Paul is clearly stating the true design of God's ordinance. Returning to the text, In Romans it says, Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. Again, let Nero be tried by this test. The primitive Christians who lived during his reign will be allowed to do that which was good. They professed and maintained the religion of the cross. They worshiped and served the Savior of the world. They waited on the ordinances of religion with exemplary diligence. They faithfully discharged the relative duties of life and conducted themselves in an orderly and inoffensive manner as members of civil society. And what was the praise they received in return? Why, they were charged with every crime, they were treated with every indignity, were tortured by every infernal device. They were crucified, and their bodies either thrown to the dogs or converted into torches with which to illuminate the Capitol. So far from the Apostles' language referring to the existing governors then, it is more natural to regard it as framed on purpose to reprove them by presenting a striking contrast. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive a more cutting sarcasm on Nero and his associates in power than is here furnished. None but the most blinded devotee to the exploded doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance would ever think of interpreting this passage of the then existing government. Nor is it easy to conceive a greater insult that could be offered to the Holy One of Israel, by whom kings reign, than to represent such a monster as Nero as the minister of God for good, or his government as the ordinance of God, which could not be resisted on pain of damnation. Without confounding all moral distinctions, it is impossible to suppose that the lawfulness of a power depends solely on the fact of its existence. The distinction between a preceptive and a providential power is not more consonant with reason and common sense than with Scripture. And if it is a breach of the obligation due to the Messiah to set up As his representatives and vice-regents, persons devoid of every requisite qualification for office, equally invariant with the duty we owe to him, must it be to honor and acknowledge such persons when set up. Those to whom conscientious submission is due in the name of Christ should certainly possess some measure of the qualifications which Christ himself has prescribed. It is absurd to suppose that nations who are the moral subjects of the Redeemer are bound in obedience to His authority to recognize and approve of as His ministers, those who overlook and despise His authority, who employ their influence in opposition to His interests, and conduct their government on principles that are immoral. It is doubtless the duty of Christians living under a government of this description to submit to it, but they are to submit to it as a chastisement sent them by God. and to conform for the sake of peace to the general order of society, while they take care at the same time to bear full and honest testimony against its evils, and to avoid whatever is calculated to involve them in a participation of its guilt. Under immoral systems of government, it is, happily, possible for Christians to do many things in compliance with the principles of social order and for the good of the commonwealth, as well as of individuals, without giving the sanction of their approbation to such systems as the ordinance of God. These things may be done from regard to their own intrinsic obligation as things moral in themselves and required by God. There is an obvious distinction betwixt doing what is enjoined and doing the same thing because it is enjoined. Lawful authority is for the most part, though not always, to be obeyed. Unlawful authority, never. Lawful authority may be employed to enjoin what is not lawful, and in this case it is not to be obeyed. Unlawful authority may be employed to enjoin what is lawful, and in this case also it is not to be obeyed. What it may be said not to be obeyed, even when requiring what is right, Certainly not. The thing enjoined is to be done. Not, however, because enjoined, but from respect to its own intrinsic obligation springing from the law and will of God. A wicked neighbor, usurping an authority which does not belong to him, intrudes into my dwelling and commands me to worship God, to love my wife, and to bring up my children in the fear of the Lord. These are lawful commands, and it isn't my peril that I neglect them. but in doing them I am not surely obeying the intruder. This distinction betwixt obedience to lawful commands out of respect to the authority enjoining them and obedience to them out of respect to their own intrinsic obligation is a most important one in a practical point of view. It enables Christians living under iniquitous and anti-Christian powers to do much that is calculated to promote the good of the community and their own civil interests without giving the sanction of their approbation to those who renounce the authority and disregard the law of Christ and thus violating their oath of allegiance to the Prince of the Kings of the Earth. Fifthly, nations as the moral subjects of Messiah the Prince are under obligation to recognize his rightful authority over them by swearing allegiance to him. It is the duty of a subject to swear allegiance to his lawful sovereign, at least he must stand prepared to do so when required, so it is with nations. Not only are the inhabitants of a nation, as occasion calls for, to enter into sacred confederation with one another in order to secure and defend their valued rights and privileges, But the nation as such, through the medium of its authorized functionaries, and by its usual forms of legal enactment, ought publicly to avow its attachment to the Lord Jesus Christ as its King and Prince, to recognize His legal authority, and to bind itself to His service by an oath. It is not supposed that the formal act of swearing allegiance is to be gone into lightly, or on all occasions. But certainly in times of deep distress, as a means of animation and comfort, in times of backsliding and danger for the purpose of promoting stability, as calculated to promote and maintain steps of reformation, and also as a fit mode of expressing gratitude for public blessings, a nation may warrantably and dutifully engage in such an exercise. The example of the nation of Israel of old might be easily adduced in circumstances such as these. The reader may consult at his leisure the following passages, Nehemiah 9 verses 1 through 13, Deuteronomy 29 verses 10 through 15, Joshua chapter 24 verse 25, 2 Kings 11 verses 17 and 20, Psalm 76 verse 11, 2 Kings 23 verses 1 through 3, and Isaiah From time to time, Israel publicly and solemnly recognized their allegiance to the Lord, their Redeemer. The transaction at Sinai partook distinctly of a federal character. The children of Israel were then put in possession of a complete body of laws for the regulation of their national concerns. Stipulations and re-stipulations were mutually passed. On the one hand, the Messiah, amid a display of awful magistrate, offered them a civil constitution and moral organization. On the other, by the repeated declaration, All that the Lord hath said we will do, the people formally accepted the gracious offer, promised obedience to it, and solemnly avowed their allegiance to Him by whom it was given. Possessing the nature, this transaction received the name of a covenant. from the gracious covenant relation in which the people of Israel stood to God. It is plain that in this whole transaction they had to do with the Son of God as mediator. In no other character could any of the guilty race of man receive blessings from Him or promise Him obedience, nor was there anything in the circumstances of that people which rendered the duty in question peculiar to them. What was adapted to promote national prosperity in their case is calculated to do the same in all cases. It is more reasonable to regard their political organization as a model to future nations than as an exception from all others. The faculties, powers, passions, rights, and interests of men are the same at all times, nor is there anything, either local or restricted in these commands, by which ancient Israel were enjoined to enter into covenant with God. Indeed, when we look into the predictions, which refer to New Testament times, we are at no loss to perceive that the duty of national vowing to the Lord is not limited to the Jews. Scripture says in Isaiah 29, verses 18 and 20, And that day shall five cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of hosts. The Egyptians shall know the Lord in that day, and shall do sacrifice and oblation. Yea, they shall vow a vow unto the Lord, and shall perform it." Here it is distinctly made known that in the days of the Gospel, Gentile countries should copy the example of ancient Canaan in the matter of vowing allegiance to the Lord. To the same effect we read in Isaiah chapter 62 verse 4, Thou shalt no more be termed forsaken, neither shall thy land any more be termed desolate, but thou shalt be called Hephzibah, and thy land Beulah, for the Lord delighteth in thee, and thy land shall be married. A land is just a people in their civil capacity. and its being married to the Lord surely denotes its being bound to him by covenant engagement as the wife is to her husband. The principle has been exemplified in more modern times in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands as well as in our own country. The National Covenant of Scotland and the Solemn League entered into by Scotland, England, and Ireland are memorable instances of national oaths of allegiance to the Messiah. These were sworn and approved by the king and his household and by persons of all ranks in the land. This is not the place to defend the nature of these noble instruments, to show their obligation on posterity, or to speak at large of the guilt that these nations have incurred by their perfidious neglect of them. These are topics, indeed, of no mean importance in themselves, besides being worthy of very serious consideration at the present time in connection with existing agitations and discussions. But we have to do with them now only as accredited and interesting exemplifications of the national duty of swearing allegiance to the Redeemer. It has been much the practice of a flippant generation to laugh at the covenant and the solemn league as the products and signs of an illiberal and unenlightened age. But it may fairly be questioned on the authority of the best historians whether our country ever appeared in a more dignified attitude than during the period in question. or whether a kingdom can ever be more dutifully or appropriately employed than in solemnly and sincerely vowing to him by whom kings reign and princes decree justice, the prince of the kings of the earth. There is still another duty of nations to the Redeemer, to which, from its importance, we shall devote a separate chapter. It is impossible, in the meantime, to review what we have written on the mediatorial dominion over the nations without reflecting that this department of the Redeemer's administration and glory has not met with sufficient attention. Its importance it is impossible to deny. Yet it is lamentable to think how inadequately it has been appreciated. By some it is almost entirely overlooked and treated with neglect. By others it is denied and speculatively opposed. It is easier to account for than to vindicate or excuse such conduct. What friend of Messiah the Prince but must lament, deeply lament, such a state of things? Oh, that men would throw aside their prejudices and, not suffering themselves to be warped by their supposed temporal interests, would come forward and at all hazards acknowledge the Redeemer as Governor among the nations. The doctrine in question is entitled to occupy a prominent place in the contending of the witnesses. It forms a chief part of the word of Christ's patience for which his disciples are to lift up a clear and manly testimony before an ungodly world and rebellious nations. Instead of being passed over altogether or thrown into obscurity or treated with a mere passive assent, It ought to stand conspicuously out in the Church's creed, to be frequently brought forward by our ministers and clearly unfolded in all its grand associations, in all its practical bearings, and in all the fullness of its consoling power. It should be held up to the nations of the earth to reprove them for their past rebellion and to admonish them regarding their future procedure. It should be urged upon them as calculated to remind them of the high and sacred duties they owe to the Messiah, of their obligations to respect His glory, to take His law as their rule, to have regard to His authority in the choice of their office-bearers, and in the subjection they yield to them to swear allegiance to His crown and to extend countenance and support to His church upon earth. Nor should it be omitted to remind them of the divine displeasure they incur and the judicial visitations to which they expose themselves by pursuing, as too many of them do, the course of unhallowed rebellion against the King of Kings. Chapter 9 Mediatorial Dominion over the Nations continued. Sixthly, it is the duty of nations as such to have respect to religion. This is a point which, from its intimate connection with the mediatorial dominion, its vast importance in itself, and its being a subject on which the public sentiment at the present time is greatly divided, demands particular consideration. That civil government has anything to do with religion is by many pointedly denied. Every sort of alliance between church and state is condemned as unlawful and unscriptural. Not content with exposing the abuses of existing civil establishments and seeking their reformation, their entire overthrow is demanded in the very principle on which they are founded held up to unmeasured reprobation. We are not blind to the evils that prevail in the national churches of our land, and should be sorry that anything we might say should have the effect of perpetuating or palliating these in the least. They are too palpable to be overlooked and too great to admit to being justified. We are not prepared to approve of the nature, even, of the connection subsisting between church and state in our existing establishments. And, of course, we frankly admit that it is not a reformation of abuses, merely, but an entire constitutional change that is needed. Nevertheless, believing as we do that it is the duty of nations to concern themselves about religion, that consequently a union between church and state of an unexceptionable kind is capable of being formed, and moreover, that the formation of such a union is not only lawful in itself, but dutiful and obligatory. We are anxious that the principle should be distinguished from the corruptions that have been grafted upon it. In lopping off and giving over to merited destruction the excreascences, it is not necessary that the root should be destroyed. In the preservation of the principle, We see involved the glory of the Messiah, the good of his church, and the best interests of civil society itself. For this reason, not by any means to uphold or apologize for existing corruptions, and whose maintenance we have no interest, and for whose continuance we have no wish, we are induced to submit the following statements respecting the duty of Christian nations toward the true religion of Jesus. It is of consequence in every controversy that parties have a distinct idea of the point in dispute. The things in which they agree and those in which they differ ought to be well understood. In the President's instance, it may not be easy to give unexceptionable definitions. We beg attention, however, to the following distinctions. It is not, whether it be the duty of a Christian nation to establish a false religion, but whether it be not its duty to establish the true religion. It is not whether it be the duty of the Church of Christ to seek alliance with a heathen, anti-Christian, and immoral state, but whether it may not enter into alliance with a government possessing the character and subserving the purposes of the moral ordinance of God. The argument is not whether it be the duty of the state merely to afford legal protection or positive toleration to the true religion, but whether it be not its duty to extend positive favor, encouragement, and support to the Church of Christ. It is not whether the Church of Christ may not exist and even prosper without the favor, encouragement, and support of the State, but whether it may not be the duty of the State to extend such countenance to the true religion. It is not whether the State has power in and over the Church so as to interfere in any way with her internal jurisdiction and management, But, whether it be not competent to, and the duty of, a Christian state to frame regulations about the Church, or respecting the external interests of religion. Whether, in short, a Christian state be not possessed of power circa sacra, though having no authority whatever in sacris. These statements will help to limit and explain the point on which the present discussion turns. And, without adopting any of the definitions of a civil establishment of religion that have been given, either by their friends or by their enemies, or venturing on any definition of our own, the proposition we design to explain, confirm, and defend is this, that it is the duty of a nation, as such, enjoying the light of revelation, in virtue of its moral subjection to the Messiah, legally to recognize, favor, and support the true religion. In this discussion, when we make use of the term state, we mean a civil government possessing the character of the moral ordinance of God. And when we speak of the church, we mean the church possessing and maintaining the true religion of Christ. First, this proposition is but a natural and necessary inference from the fact already established of national subjection to the Messiah. Nations and their rulers are, as we have seen, the subjects of Christ. They are under not only his providential control, but his moral authority. Now, the religion of Christ, that is to say, his church or spiritual kingdom, must be to him an object of the deepest interest. It is that, indeed, to which everything else is subordinate. To it, of course, the nations of the world must be subordinate, and if so, is it not utterly inconceivable that they should be freed from all obligation to have respect to the interests of religion? Indeed, it sounds paradoxical or self-contradictory to say that nations, which hold so prominent a place among the moral subjects of the Messiah, should be not only exempted, but absolutely prohibited from taking any concern about that which is dearest to the heart of their sovereign. The dominion of the head of the Church over civil society renders it not only expedient and safe, but dutiful and obligatory for nations as such to interest themselves about the true religion. The doctrine of the mediatorial headship over the nations lays a firm and ample foundation for an alliance between church and state, which has been rashly pronounced to be in every case unlawful, unchristian, and sinful. While this doctrine is admitted, it will be difficult to refuse the legitimacy of the inference in favor of the alliance in question. If men would only look, without prejudice, at the plain testimony of revelation, there might be less disputing on this point. Does not the Apostle Paul speak of God having put all things under the feet of Christ and given him to be head over all things to the church? Mark the language. He is not only head over all things, but head over all things to the church. It is for the sake of the church that he has invested with universal regal authority. In other words, the end of Christ's universal mediatorial dominion is the good of the church. Thus far, all is clear and undeniable. But the nations are among the all things over which Christ is appointed head. It follows, then, that Christ is appointed head over the nations for the good of the church. If so, there must be some way in which the nations are capable of subserving the interests of the church. Is it possible, then, to conceive that it is not the duty of the nations to promote by every means in their power the good of the church? Is it conceivable that nations are not under obligations to advance the very end for which they are placed in subjection to Christ? Believe this, who can? To us it appears that, although there were not another passage on the subject in the whole Bible, that which we have now in view should be sufficient to prevent us from giving our assent to the proposition that the nations have nothing to do with religion. We are not unaware that an inference of an opposite nature has been drawn from the mediatorial dominion over the nations. The argument is this. Christ as mediator is governor of the nations. He does not govern the nations immediately, but has delegated this to the people. The people, however, are almost universally wicked. It is, therefore, absurd to suppose that the Redeemer should commit the care of His church to the wicked. But in this mode of reasoning there are several fallacious and mistaken assumptions. It is, first of all, assumed that the theory of an establishment supposes that Christ commits His church to the care of His civil government. whereas all that it implies is that it is the duty of the civil government to extend countenance and protection to the Church of Christ. There is farther the unreasonable and pernicious assumption that organized civil society and the world lying in wickedness are one and the same, whereas the one is the kingdom of Satan, who is the god of this world, and the other a moral ordinance of God. Moreover, while it is admitted that Christ has committed the power of government, in some sense, to the people, it is forgotten that he has, in his word, both commanded the people to qualify themselves for the right use of this power and furnished them with an infallible rule to guide them in the exercise of it. Secondly, the manner in which the object of the magistrate's office is described in the New Testament confirms and illustrates the preceding observation. He is the minister of God for good, and a terror not to good works, but to the evil. The terms good and evil are expressed without limitation or restriction. And without some other information than the passage itself furnishes, we are surely not warranted to conclude either that offenses against religion form no part of the evil, which it is the duty of the ruler to discourage, or that the interests of true religion form no part of the good, which it becomes him to promote. Had it been said, writes Dr. Willis, power is an ordinance merely to enforce common justice between man and man, or to protect one from another's violence, and had the ideas of justice and protection been carefully limited according to the modern theory, which by the way circumscribes them almost as arbitrarily as the scripture terms good and evil themselves, Had it thus defined the magistrate's province, then our controversy with those who are ever alleging that secular things only fall within his care were at an end. But to let it be observed, no such limitation is introduced. It is not said, indeed, on the other hand, what offenses the magistrate is to resent under the head of evil, nor how far and by what means he is to promote good. But we ask, does not the burden of proving that offenses against religion are excluded from the one? or that the positive advancement of that cause is not included in the other, lie upon our opponents? The analogy of the Old Testament entitles us to call for this. But our right to call for it rests on the broader ground of the moral relation in which the ruler, as well as the nation, stands to God. A moral relation for which the moral law must be the rule. We claim on this ground a positive right to interpret the expressions above quoted in a larger sense. We must remind him who would restrict the province of the civil authorities to the second table of the law, that crimes against the first table are not only at least equally offensive to the God of the nations, but equally injurious to the safety of the state. Outrages on the majesty of heaven, open contempt of the mysteries and the rights of religion, are more to be dreaded by society than even fraud or oppression, and will more certainly work a nation's ruin. And on the other hand, the good connected with the encouragement of sound morals and the diffusion of Christian truth is more valuable than any resolving from the wisest human policy acting merely on the selfish principle of man. We do not then forget that the more immediate end of civil government is the outward order of the community. But if every ordinance of God is bound, as it surely is to seek its end in connection with His glory who ordained it, They who rule may not warrantably regard with indifference the best, because the divinely appointed means of moralizing and civilizing the human race. And besides that of a right and wise policy, surely he who is God's minister for good must be bound, as far as secular power may go, to second its higher object. The scriptures of the Old Testament undoubtedly contain divinely approved examples of such a connection between church and state as that for which we contend. Under the patriarchal economy, which, by the way, bore a closer resemblance in many respects to the Christian dispensation than did the Jewish, we meet with a striking combination of things civil and ecclesiastical and Melchizedek. This remarkable person was both a king and a priest. See Genesis 14 verse 18 and Hebrews chapter 7 verse 1. He was a king of Salem, that is, a prince, a monarch, possessed of regal authority and exercising civil dominion over a particular district more or less extensive and populous. He was also priest of the Most High God, that is, invested with the sacred functions of the sacerdotal office and appointed to treat with God on behalf of men by means of sacrifice. These offices were real, not figurative merely. His bringing forth bread and wine to Abraham when returning from the slaughter of the kings was a regal act. His blessing Abraham and receiving from him tithes distinctly recognizes his sacerdotal character. Now the fact of these offices being combined in the same person Whatever design there may have been to point forward by it to him who sits a priest upon his throne, shows that there is no such incompatibility between things civil and sacred as to render all union of them necessarily sinful and improper. It is utterly inconceivable that Melchizedek was required either on the one hand to abstain from any exercise of his regal functions which might subserve the ends of his priesthood, or on the other, in the discharge of his sacerdotal functions, to avoid having any regard of the civil interests of the people over whom he ruled. Such a separation of objects and interests may be pronounced to have been in the circumstances impracticable and, to say the least, unnatural. This is sufficient to convince us that it was not required. And we may safely conclude that Melchizedek, in acting in the double capacity of King of Salem and priest of the Most High God, felt no jarring of claims, no jealousy of interests, but the most perfect harmony and cooperation between the functions of his respective offices. Here then we have one example, at least, of the combination of things civil and sacred, possessing the authority and approbation of God, as it is spoken of in the Scriptures, not only without censure, but with obvious commendation. We have another example under the Mosaic economy in the case of the Jewish kings. Into the nature or details of the civil establishment of religion under the law it is not necessary that we here enter. We have at present to do with the fact that legal countenance and support were given under that dispensation to the church. If Moses and Joshua, David, Solomon, Hezekiah, Josiah concern themselves in their capacity of civil rulers about the interests of religion, about the erection of places of worship, the support of the ministers, the removal of obstructions, and the correction of abuses, that will not be denied. This is all that we require for our present purpose. It proves, beyond all controversy, that union of church and state is not necessarily, abstractly, or in itself sinful. Else it never could have received the sanction of divine approbation at any time. There may be room for discussion as to the kind of union that happens to exist, or that may be proposed to be formed, or as to the expediency of forming a union at all in certain given circumstances. But the undeniable fact of its having once existed, and that for a lengthened period with the express approval of heaven, demonstrates that there is nothing sinful in the thing itself. This, one should think, ought to teach a lesson of moderation to our opponents in the denunciations in which they are accustomed to indulge. However unsparing in their censure of abuses, or decided in their opinion of inexpediency, they ought to be aware of even seeming to cast a reflection on the wisdom and rectitude of the Almighty by unceremoniously pronouncing all civil establishments of religion as, in their very nature and tendency, unscriptural, anti-Christian, oppressive, unjust, and essentially sinful. Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? And as if to teach us, in the most impressive manner, the perfect compatibility of a friendly alliance between civil and ecclesiastical matters, As if to make it palpable to all and forever that there is nothing incongruous in the union of the king and the priest, the throne and the altar, the scepter and the censer, the crown and the mitre, at every stage of the Jewish history we meet with two distinguished characters, the one civil and the other sacred, acting together at conspicuous part and exhibiting the most perfectly harmonious cooperation. Such were Moses and Aaron, Joshua and Eleazar, David and Abiathar, Solomon and Zadok, Hezekiah and Azariah, Zerubbabel and Joshua. These are the two anointed ones that stand by the Lord of the whole earth. See Zechariah chapter 4 verse 14. To all this it may be said in reply that these are Jewish things, that they belong to a system which has vanished away. They furnish no pattern for the imitation of believers under the New Testament dispensation. It is admitted that there were some things peculiar in the Jewish establishment which succeeding nations are not bound to imitate. But it will not surely be contended for that the whole was peculiar. There were certainly some things about it both moral and exemplary, and the question is whether the duty of the civil ruler to insist himself about religion was not one of these things. It is not pleaded that all of the actions of rulers among the Jews are imitable by Christian magistrates, or that the latter have exactly the same power which was allotted to and exercised by the former. But it will not follow from this that we can draw no argument from the conduct of Jewish rulers to establish the warrantableness and duty of Christian magistrates employing their power in support of religion. Some are ready to conclude that the argument is entirely set aside when it is allowed that there is not an absolute sameness between the two cases. Nothing can, however, be more unfounded than this conclusion. Such a mode of reasoning is of the most dangerous tendency, and if applied in all the extent to which it will lead, it would cut off the practical use of the greater part of the Old Testament. According to it, no argument could be drawn from the approved examples which it records of persons of any rank or in any station, of parents, children, husbands, wives, masters, servants, because many of their actions were peculiar or clothed with extraordinary circumstances. The Apostle argues for the support of a gospel ministry from that which was given to the Levitical priesthood, but his argument did not imply that they should be supported exactly in the same way. See 1 Corinthians 9, verses 13 and 14. The priestly and prophetical offices were extraordinary and typical, a sense in which the regal among the Jews was not. Yet we do not scruple to illustrate the office and enforce the duties of ministers of the gospel from those of the priests and prophets, especially in their actions with reference to the public state of religion and in advancing reformation. The judgments inflicted upon the Israelites in the wilderness were in many respects peculiar, yet the Apostle holds them out as monetary examples to the Corinthians. 1 Corinthians 10. The prayer of Elijah was extraordinary, yet the Apostle James urges it as exemplary to Christians. James 5, verses 16-18. And shall we suppose that the actions of Jewish magistrates form a single exception, and that they were so peculiar that we cannot reason from them in the way of example or analogy? Persons may affect a talk of the difficulty of ascertaining what is moral and exemplary from what was peculiar, and by dwelling on the more intricate, cases may endeavor to lead away the attention from the subject altogether. But why should it be magnified and represented as insurmountable any more than others of a similar kind? Continued on tape 7. By email we're at SWRB at SWRB.com. Our mailing address is 4710-37A Avenue, Edmonton. That's E-D-M-O-N-T-O-N, Alberta, abbreviated capital A, capital B, Canada, T6L3T5. By phone, After February of 1999, our area code will change. We can be reached by phone at 780-450-3730. And keep in mind that William Hetherington, commenting on the Solemn League and Covenant, the epitome of Second Reformation attainments, in his History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, 1856 edition, page 134, writes, No man who is able to understand its nature, and to feel and appreciate its spirit and aim, will deny it to be the wisest, the sublimest, and the most sacred document ever framed by uninspired men.