A Selection from Historical Theology Volume 1 by William Cunningham Chapter 13 Civil and Ecclesiastical Authorities In surveying the history of the Church, we see the supreme civil powers, after the age of Constantine, professing to feel an obligation to exert their civil authority for the welfare of the Church and the good of religion. and interfering to a large extent in religious, theological and ecclesiastical matters, professedly in the discharge of this obligation. We see enough to prove that the Church in all its interests was very materially affected, for better or worse, by this interference of the civil powers. We see disputes between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities about their respective functions and obligations, their powers and prerogatives. We see these disputes coming to a great crisis or era in the contentions between the Emperor Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII, when the ecclesiastical power put forth a claim to entire and absolute supremacy over the civil. And this contest between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities has continued in every age down to the present day. It has excited no small interest in our own day. and it is likely not only to continue to be discussed as a question of argument, but to produce important practical results. It may therefore be proper briefly to advert to it. The whole topics which have been or which need to be discussed with reference to this subject may be comprehended under these two questions. What relation ought to subsist between the state and the church or the civil and ecclesiastical powers? And what are the principles that ought to regulate this relation? Section 1. Voluntarism. The discussion of these questions has given rise to four systems of opinion, and we shall begin with the newest or most modern because it is also in some respects the simplest and most sweeping. It is what is assumed to itself, though inaccurately and unwarrantedly, the name of the voluntary system. a name derived from a partial representation of one of the views to which the principle leads, and not, in any respect, fairly descriptive of the principle itself. It amounts in substance to this, that the only relation that ought to subsist between the State and the Church, between civil government and religion, is that of entire separation. Or, in other words, its advocates maintain that nations as such, and civil rulers in their official capacity, not only are not bound but are not at liberty to interfere in any religious matters or to seek to promote the welfare of the Church of Christ as such. This theory, if true, supersedes the necessity of all further inquiry into the principles that ought to regulate the relation between Church and State, for it really implies that no connection should subsist, or can lawfully subsist, between them. All the other answers which have been given to the question propounded assume the falsehood of this theory, and are based upon an assertion of the opposite that nations as such and civil rulers in their official capacity are entitled and bound to aim at the promotion of the interests of true religion and the welfare of the Church of Christ, that there are things which they can lawfully do which are fitted to promote these objects, and that thus a connection may be legitimately formed between church and state. Hence, in taking a general survey of the subject of the relation that ought to subsist between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, it is most natural and convenient to begin with considering this voluntary principle, as it has been called, since, if true, it supersedes all further inquiry. It has been very fully discussed of late years. In common with many others, I took part in these discussions, and I have certainly not changed my opinion concerning it. I still believe it to be a portion of divine truth. fully sanctioned by the word of God, and therefore never to be abandoned or denied, that an obligation lies upon nations and their rulers to have respect in the regulation of their national affairs and in the application of national resources to the authority of God's word, to the welfare of the church of Christ, and the interests of true religion. This is the only scriptural truth, and therefore the only matter of principle which those who support the doctrine of national establishments of religion feel called upon to maintain. or about which they cherish any solicitude. Everything beyond this is of inferior importance. It is to no purpose to adduce against this truth the doctrine of the unlawfulness of intolerance or persecution, or of the assumption of jurisdiction by civil authorities in religious and ecclesiastical matters. For the undoubted truth of these doctrines merely limits or marks out the sphere within which alone it is competent for the civil authorities to act in the discharge of their obligations. It certainly does not prove the non-existence of the obligation itself, unless indeed it be at the same time proved, and this we are persuaded cannot be done, that civil authorities cannot possibly do anything directed to the object of promoting the interest of religion in the Church without necessarily in ipso facto interfering with the rights of conscience and the freedom, independence, and spirituality of the Church of Christ. It is, of course, equally irrelevant to argue against this truth from the abuses that have been too often manifested in the practical application of it, as when error instead of truth, a corrupt instead of a pure church, has been aided and promoted by the civil authorities, or when, even though scriptural truth and a pure church may have been aided, there was yet so much that was defective and erroneous in the way in which the civil power interposed as to do more than to neutralize the benefits resulting from its interference. The most plausible thing that has been alleged upon this branch of the subject is that the interference of civil authorities in religious matters as a whole has been accompanied and followed with a great preponderance of evil to religion. But neither does this, even though it were conceded as a matter of fact, disprove the truth of the general principle of the duty or obligation as it may be asserted and proved on the other side that the evils have arisen merely from the duty not having been correctly understood or discharged in the right way. It is equally little to the purpose to allege, as if in opposition to this truth, that Christ left his church dependent upon the voluntary contributions of his people, without any assistance from or interference on the part of civil rulers, and allowed it to continue in this condition for eight hundred years. The fact that he did so is an important one. and is fitted and intended to convey some valuable lessons, but assuredly does not teach us anything about what the duty of nations and rulers to the Church is. The fact referred to affords satisfactory and conclusive evidence of these positions, but a condition of entire separation from the State and entire dependence upon the contributions of the people is a perfectly lawful and honorable condition for a Church of Christ to occupy. and that the Church may flourish largely, both internally and externally, without any countenance or assistance from the civil powers, and accomplish fully all its essential objects. It proves this, but it proves nothing more. The conduct of the civil authorities to the Church during that period was not certainly the model according to which civil rulers ought to act. They were not then discharging their duty to the Church, for they generally persecuted it. If they were not discharging aright their duty to the Church, which by universal admission is at least entitled to toleration, and if their non-discharge of duty actually affected the condition of the Church, then it is manifest that the manner in which they acted and the state in which the Church was, in consequence placed, afforded no materials whatever for deciding how they ought to have acted, and of course the whole subject of whether any, and if any, obligations lie upon rulers in regard to religion and the Church is left wholly untouched. to be decided, as every question of truth and duty should be, by the written word. Attempts have been made to show that whatever duty or obligation may seem to lie upon civil rulers in this matter, the Church is interdicted by the law of her Master from entering into an alliance with the State or accepting assistance from the civil power. That the Church is interdicted from sacrificing any of the rights or privileges which Christ has conferred upon her neglecting or promising to neglect any of the duties which he has imposed upon her, disregarding or promising to disregard any of the directions he has given her, in order to obtain, or as a condition of enjoying, the favor and assistance of the kingdoms of this world, is certain. And assuredly this guilt does at the moment attach to every Protestant ecclesiastical establishment in the world. But it has never been proved that if the civil authorities rightly understood their duties, and were willing to discharge them a right, attaching no unwarrantable conditions to their offers of service, they could not render assistance to the Church which she might be fully warranted to accept. These considerations, when expanded and applied, are, I think, quite sufficient to answer the objection by which the scriptural principle that a general obligation lies upon nations and their rulers to aim in the regulation of national affairs at the good of the Church of Christ and the welfare of the true has been opposed, and to ward us in maintaining that this is a portion of scriptural truth which the Church ought to hold forth and which nations and their rulers ought to act upon. At the same time, it is undoubtedly true that in most cases the interference of the civil power in religious matters has done more evil than good, and that the instances have been very numerous in which churches have consented to sinful interferences upon the part of the civil authorities. with the rights and privileges with which Christ had conferred upon them. Indeed, I am not sure that any Protestant established church has ever wholly escaped this sin and degradation, except the Church of Scotland at the era of the Second Reformation. For even the Revolution settlement, though to a very large extent based upon scriptural principles, was not perfectly free from all defect or imperfection. It was grievously encroached upon by the restoration of patronage at the beginning of the last century. Its fundamental principles were overturned by the recent interferences of the civil authorities, so that it became impossible for a man who had scriptural views of what a Church of Christ is, and of what are the principles by which its affairs ought to be regulated, to remain in connection with it. Section 2â€"Coordinate Authorities Assuming that what has been called the voluntary principle is untrue and that nations and rulers have duties to discharge toward the Church of Christ, which may lead to the formation of an alliance or union or connection between them, we return to the question, what are the principles that ought to regulate the relation that may be formed and may subsist between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities as representing the state and the church? the relation may be formed and carried out, either upon the principle of the equality and independence of the two powers, or upon that of the subordination of the one to the other. And under this latter head of subordination, it may be contended either that the Church is and should be subordinate to the State, a doctrine known in modern theological literature in this country under the name of Erastianism, often called on the continent Byzantinism, or that the State is subordinate to the Church, which is the doctrine of the Church of Rome. The first of these principles, that of the equality and independence of the civil and ecclesiastical powers, the independent supremacy of each in its own proper sphere and within its own peculiar province, is that which is sanctioned by the word of God. It has been held in substance, though it must be admitted with different degrees of clearness and firmness, by most Protestant writers, but by none so clearly and firmly as by Scottish Presbyterians. who have always been accustomed to condemn all deviations from it or corruptions of it in theory or in practice, as involving either Erastianism or Popery. The advocates of the voluntary principle concur with us in thinking that the Church and the State are two co-equal and independent powers, each supreme in its own province and in the execution of its own functions. But then they deduce from this principle the conclusion that there can be no union or alliance between them, and that because distinct and independent they should always remain separate from each other. We dispute the soundness of this conclusion, and maintain that, in entire consistency with the preservation of their proper distinctness and independence, they may enter into a friendly alliance with each other upon terms of equality, retaining all their own proper and inherent rights and prerogatives, the unfettered exercise of their own functions, and yet may afford to each other important assistance. Of course, we do not need to prove against them the original distinctness and independence of the civil and ecclesiastical powers, and the necessity of this distinctness and independence being always preserved, for in this they fully concur with us, but merely to show that the existence of this original distinctness and independence, and the necessity of its being always maintained, are not inconsistent with, and do not necessarily obstruct or prevent the formation of a union or friendly alliance between them. That civil government is an ordinance of God, that nations and their rulers are accountable directly to God, and are not put into subjection to the Church or to its office-bearers, and that the members and office-bearers of the Church are, in common with other men, subject in all civil things to the powers that be, are doctrines which can easily be shown to be sanctioned by the word of God. That the visible Church of Christ is an independent society, distinct from the kingdoms of this world, having a constitution, laws, office-bearers, and functions of its own, and that civil rulers, as such, have no right to exercise any jurisdiction or authoritative control in the regulation of its affairs, can be established with equal clearness from the sacred scriptures. Of course, these doctrines, if true, virtually prescribe the state of things which ought to exist and to exist always, or, in other words, establish the position that the relation which ought to subsist between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities is one of equality and independence. and that this equality and independence must ever be maintained inviolate. Practical difficulties may arise from the existence of two equal and independent powers having jurisdictions over the same persons, and operating in some sense within the same sphere, though their provinces are different, and these have been set forth fully both by Popish and Erastian writers under the head of an imperium in imperio, in order to establish the general position. But the only question is, does not the word of God represent them as being, and of course make them to be, de jure, distinct and independent? Does not this impose an obligation upon all concerned to regard and treat them as such, and to preserve them, as far as possible, in that condition? To this question but one answer can be given, and it establishes upon the authority of God's word the truth of the Presbyterian doctrine, or so we may call that the relation of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, even when they are united together, should be regulated throughout by the principle of their distinctness from, and independence of, each other. With reference to the theory of subordination, it is to be observed that Papists and Erastians, though running to opposite extremes, start from the same point. and combine in the use of one leading argument, which they think proves subordination generally, without determining on which side it lies. It is that to which we have already referred, as based upon the alleged absurdities and mischiefs of an imperium in imperio, from which they infer the necessity of one supreme power, which shall be possessed of ultimate jurisdiction in all matters, civil and ecclesiastical. The answer to this we have already indicated, that the word of God represents them as two distinct societies, with distinct laws and office-bearers, and that we have no right to change their character in government because of difficulties, actual or apprehended, especially as we can also prove that these difficulties can be easily adjusted and prevented by the application of scriptural views of the distinctive provinces, functions, and objects of the two powers or societies. Thus far the Papists and the Erastians agree in opposition to the Presbyterians and the Word of God, but here they part company and proceed in opposite directions, the Erastians ascribing superiority or supremacy to the civil and the Papists to the ecclesiastical power. Let us first advert briefly to the Erastian extreme. The Erastian controversy is much bolder than Erastus, who flourished soon after the Reformation, in the latter part of the 16th century, and had basis for his opponent. Ever since the civil power began in the 4th century to interfere in religious matters, there have been discussions on this subject. The first topic that was discussed at any length, for no one then disputed the right and duty of the civil magistrate to advance the cause of religion and the welfare of the Church, represented the question of toleration and persecution. or the right of the civil power to inflict temporal punishment upon heretics and schismatics. This was defended by Gregory Nazanzin and also by Augustine in his controversy with the Donatists, who changed his opinion upon the question, and changed it for the worse, having been at one time opposed to the infliction of temporal punishments for religious errors, though he always continued to oppose the lawfulness of putting men to death for heresy. This restriction, which Augustine insisted upon putting on the exercise of the magistrate's right to inflict temporal punishments upon heretics, was soon disregarded. And before the middle of the fifth century, Augustine died in 430, Pope Leo the Great, as he is called, effected and defended the taking away the life of a heretic, the practice being thus appropriately introduced among professing Christians by the head of that communion, one of whose scriptural characteristics it is that she is drunk with the blood of the saints. This doctrine was unchallenged, and it was acted upon to a fearful extent until the time of the Reformation, and even then it was not rejected by all the Reformers. For it cannot be denied that both Calvin and Beza maintained the lawfulness of putting heretics to death, a doctrine which was held by some eminent Protestant divides even in the seventeenth century. It is now universally abandoned. except by papists, and we need not dwell upon it. But since I have been led to advert to it, I may remark in passing that the defense of the rights of conscience in modern times, in opposition to intolerance and persecution, has been often conducted upon very latitudinarian and dangerous principles, in the way of dwelling upon the difficulty, if not impossibility, of discerning truth, the innocence, almost, if not altogether, of error. In short, upon grounds manifesting in ignorance or negation of the paramount claims of truth and the responsibility connected with the discovery and the maintenance of it. This remark applies not only to Voltaire and to men of that stamp, but also to Jeremy Taylor and Locke in their writings upon this subject, and to many in our own day. The best and safest course in setting forth the rights of conscience and in opposing intolerance and persecution is to adhere to negative ground, and merely to maintain that no man has a right to dictate or prescribe authoritatively to another in matters of religion, that it is unwarrantable and unlawful to inflict temporal punishments merely on account of errors in religious opinion, and that, of course, it is robbery to take away men's property and murder to take away their lives merely on this ground. The emperors, from the time when they came to make a profession of Christianity and to interfere in ecclesiastical matters, assumed a large measure of authority in regulating the affairs of the Church. The distinction between things without and things within, on which Constantine professed to act, and which, to some extent, he did observe, was soon forgotten, or interpreted so as to bring almost everything under civil control. And for several centuries what would be called in the language of modern times gross Erastianism generally prevailed. The first thing that interfered with its dominion was the rising power of the bishops of Rome. who had length succeeded, to some extent, in depriving the civil power of some of its just rights, and subjecting it to ecclesiastical control. In the disputes between the popes and the temporal sovereigns, and in the treatises written on both sides in defense of the claims and procedure of the two parties, there seems to have been scarcely an approach made toward sound scriptural views upon the proper relation of the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. There was a constant leaning, both in what was done and in what was written, either to the Popish or the Erastean extreme. After the Reformation, many of the Protestant princes succeeded in securing to themselves a large share of the power in ecclesiastical matters which had formerly been held by the Bishop of Rome, which our Presbyterian forefathers used to say was just changing the Pope, but not the Popedom. And in no country were they more successful than in England, and none less so than in The alleged merit of Erastus, which has procured for him the honor of being ordinarily spoken of in theological literature as the representative of a set of opinions much older than his time, and which he himself did not do very much towards unfolding or applying, lay in this, that he, more distinctly than any before him, laid down the principle that Christ has not appointed a government in the hands of church officers distinct from the civil magistrate. Though Erastus himself applied this principle chiefly to exclude excommunication, or the exercise of jurisdiction by the Church in the admission or expulsion of ordinary members, yet it obviously admits of, and indeed requires, a wider application. And the principle itself, and all that naturally is involved in it, or results from it, has been usually exposed and denounced by Presbyterian divines under the designation of Therastianism. The word is often used, indeed, in a wider sense as a general designation of views which ascribe a larger measure of authority to the civil magistrate in religious matters than those who use it regarding as warranted by scripture. Just as Pelagianism is often used to designate in general views which ascribe a larger measure of power to men to do the will of God than those who use it think the scripture sanctions. The general usage of theological writers abundantly warrants this wide and vague application of it. But among Scottish Presbyterians it has been commonly employed in the somewhat more restricted and definite sense which has just been explained. Although Erastianism, used as a general designation of views which ascribe to civil rulers a power and authority in religious matters which the scripture does not sanction, may be justly enough described as making the church subordinate to the state, in opposition to the Popish extreme of making the state subordinate to the church. Yet the direct and formal maintenance of this position has not usually been the form which the controversy assumes. The Papists, indeed, do not scruple openly and explicitly to lay down the doctrine of the subordination of the State to the Church, and think that they can adduce a plausible argument in support of this doctrine from the higher and more exalted character of the ends or objects for which the Church was instituted. Erastians, having no such plausible pretense for laying down an analogous though opposite general position, have felt it necessary to go about the elevation of the civil and the degradation of the ecclesiastical power in a somewhat more indirect and insidious way. And the most ingenious contrivance they have been able to devise with this view is to deny that Christ has appointed a distinct and independent government in the Church for the regulation of its affairs. They first attempt to give some measure of probability to the position by the principle formerly adverted to and exposed. of the necessity of there being but one supreme government possessed of ultimate jurisdiction in all things. And then they try to show that in the scriptural view of the church and its constitution there is no provision made for the exercise of anything like an independent judicial or forensic authority in deciding controversies or causes that may arise about religious and ecclesiastical matters. laboring to explain away the scriptural statements by which it has been conclusively proved that the right of deciding judicially or forensically all those questions which must arise wherever a church exists and is in operation belongs by Christ's appointment not to civil rulers but to ecclesiastical office bearers and the church itself. The main question then comes to this. Has Christ appointed a distinct government in the church? with judicial authority for the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs and the right of deciding, according to the word of God, all questions that may arise in the discharge of its ordinary functions? Or, what is virtually and practically the same question in another form, is it accordant with Scripture that civil rulers should possess an exercised jurisdiction or a right of authoritative judicial decision in ecclesiastical matters? Perhaps it may be said that men have been often called Erastians who have never denied a distinct government in the Church or ascribed jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters to civil rulers. This is quite true, but it does not by any means follow that the designation was unwarranted. Erastians have commonly been men who are not so much concerned about the maintenance of permanent scriptural truth or the establishment of general theological principles as about the promotion of some present selfish object. defending the existing proceedings of civil rulers, or palliating their own conduct and submitting to church encroachments upon the rights of the church. Hence they have usually avoided, as well they could, the assertion of general positions, the maintenance of abstract principles, and have exerted their ingenuity in keeping the true question and its proper merits in the background. Some of them, like the judicious hooker, have confounded altogether the members of the Church and the State, and have virtually denied that the Church is a distinct independent society. Others, admitting that it is in some sense a distinct independent society, have denied that this society has a distinct government, or an independent power of judicial decision in ecclesiastical matters according to the word of God. While others, again without formally denying a distinct government altogether, have set themselves to curtail the sphere or province within which this government is to be exercised. especially by fabricating and trying to illustrate a distinction, which is altogether unnecessary and unfounded, between spiritual and ecclesiastical matters. And many more, who might with perfect justice be called Erastians, have abstained wholly from the discussion of general principles, and have confined themselves to an attempt to palliate and gloss over the interferences which the civil authority might happen at the time to be making and opposition or resistance to which might have proved inconvenient or dangerous. The Erastean constitution of the Church of England was certainly not settled as the result of anything like a deliberate consideration of what on general scriptural principles ought to be the relation between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. It was determined solely by the arbitrary usurpations of Henry VIII and his daughter Queen Elizabeth and the submission of the Church to almost anything which they chose to demand. And the consequences have been, first, that in the thirty-seventh article of that Church, the supremacy which is attributed to the sovereign is described with a considerable measure of vagueness and ambiguity, while there is enough in it to warrant us in ascribing to that Church the assertion of the jurisdiction of civil rulers in ecclesiastical matters, in opposition to the word of God. that Episcopalian divines, in defending the ecclesiastical supremacy of the crown as established by law, have never ventured to moot the great principles of the question as to the nature and conditions of the relation that ought to subsist between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in a frank and manly way, or to discuss general doctrines upon the subject, but have contended themselves with palliating the existing state of things. and deducing examples of the exercise of similar authority on the part of Christian emperors before their powers were curtailed by the bishops of Rome. Section 4. Popish Theory We have now only to advert to the Popish Theory, some knowledge of which is necessary, to understand the contests which occupy a very prominent place in the ecclesiastical history of several centuries. and a correct acquaintance with which is necessary in order to see how utterly baseless is the charge which has been so often adduced against the scriptural principles upon this subject, that they are identical with those of the Church of Rome. This charge has been frequently adduced against Presbyterian principles by Erastians, and it is still a favorite one with them even at the present day. I have had occasion before to show that it requires some portion of knowledge and discrimination to handle a right to the charge of a doctrine or practice being Popish. and this subject affords another illustration of the lesson. The practice among Erastians of charging scriptural Presbyterian principles with being Popish seems to have originated in England in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. At that period, the ecclesiastical supremacy of the crown, which of course can be defended only on Erastian grounds, was assailed by two classes of adversaries, the Puritans or Presbyterians and the Papists. So far as mere opposition to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the crown is concerned, It is quite true that the Presbyterians and the Papists had a common cause to maintain, and supported it to some extent upon common grounds. Its Episcopalian defenders found it no easy matter to answer the arguments of either party upon this subject, and therefore adopted a policy, which has been always a favorite one with Erastians, of evading the real merits of the question, and endeavoring to create a prejudice against their opponents by dwelling upon the mere fact that Presbyterians and Papists agreed upon this subject and trying to persuade men to receive this as proof of the erroneousness of the principles which they held. It is quite true that there are some points of agreement upon this subject between Presbyterians and Papists, but it is also true that there is a clear line of demarcation between their principles upon the general subject of the relation that ought to subsist between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. And it is not true, though this is the practical conclusion with which Erastians would wish to insinuate, that there is no medium between Popish and Erastean principles. Insofar as Presbyterians agree upon this subject with Papists, they undertake to prove that their views are sanctioned by the word of God, and when this is proved, it is no sufficient reason to abandon them because they are also held, though as in the case of many other doctrines held with some grossly corrupt additions, by the Church of Rome. We would briefly advert first to the points in which Presbyterians and Papists agree upon this general subject, and then secondly to those on which they differ. The substance of their agreement just lies in this, that they concur in opposing all Erastian principles, i.e., everything implying or tending towards or deducible from the subordination of the Church to the State, or the ascription to civil rulers of any jurisdiction or right of authoritative whether direct or indirect, in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs in the government of Christ's house. And on this ground they concur in opposing the ecclesiastical supremacy of the crown and all that is implied in it. They concur also, of course, in the leading scriptural grounds on which they rest their opposition to Erastianism, which are in substance these. First, that though scripture imposes upon civil rulers an obligation to promote the interests of true religion and the Church of Christ, It does not invest them with any jurisdiction or authoritative control in religious or ecclesiastical matters, i.e., though to use a distinction in frequent use among the old Presbyterian writers in opposing Erastianism, it gives them a power circa sacra. It gives them none in sacris. And, secondly, that the scriptural views of the origin and character, constitution, and government of the Christian Church are necessarily and obviously exclusive of the idea of its being subordinate to the state or of civil rulers having any jurisdiction or authoritative control over the regulation of its affairs. These are the scriptural grounds on which all intelligent opposition to Erastianism must rest, and they are not the less clear and conclusive because papists concur with Presbyterians in maintaining them. Opposition to Erastianism, however, is not a mere negation when viewed in connection with the scriptural grounds on which it is based. It includes or implies an assertion of some important positive principles with respect to the constitution and government of the Church of Christ. And we need not be afraid to say that there is one great and important scriptural truth upon this subject, which, like the doctrine of the Trinity, has always been held by the Church of Rome, and been fully followed out by it to all its consequences. that the Church is a divine institution established by Christ, placed by Him in a condition of entire independence of any secular or foreign control, and invested by Him with full powers of self-government and complete sufficiency within itself for the execution of all its functions. The doctrine of the Church, meaning thereby the statement of the principles of Scripture on the subject of the Church, has, as we have had occasion to show, been greatly corrupted by the Church of Rome. But the doctrine just stated, which that Church holds, assuredly has the full sanction of scriptural authority, and therefore all men are not only warranted, but bound to believe it. In this doctrine, with respect to the character and constitution of the church, and in the consequent rejection of all secular or civil jurisdiction in the administration of its affairs, Papists and Presbyterians do generally agree. And whatever may be the motives which induce Papists to maintain it, all Presbyterians who are worthy of the name adhere to it, because they believe and can prove that it is taught in the word of God. In accordance with the general Erastian policy already described, the defenders or palliators of civil jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters have evaded a fair and manly discussion of the prescriptural grounds on which their views and conduct have been assailed, and the Episcopalian defenders of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown have always shown a very great unwillingness to lay down any distinct or definite positions by which they might vindicate their own cause. And, while often on this account contradicting one another, they have found their principal satisfaction in trying to play off the Presbyterians against the Papists and the Papists against the Presbyterians, and in producing instances from the earlier history of the Church in which civil rulers assumed as wide a jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters as that which they are bound by their position to defend. We find in some Popish writers not only unanswerable arguments against all Erastianism, but likewise much good scriptural matter, in defense of the dignity and independence of the Church of Christ, brought out occasionally in a tone and spirit which is certainly of a somewhat higher and nobler kind than is usually exhibited in any exposition of the grovelling and secular views of the Erastians. But the Church of Rome has polluted and corrupted all the doctrines of God's Word even those in which she has retained in form a substantially sound profession of the truth, and it is mainly by her errors and corruptions upon the subject of the constitution and government and ordinances of the Church, and of the relation that ought to persist between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities, that she has gained and preserved her despotic control over the minds and consciences of men and the regulation of the affairs of the world. She holds the theory that the civil power is subordinate to the ecclesiastical, and she has followed out this theory both in speculation and in practice to an extent which has produced much error and much mischief. Presbyterians deny equally the subordination of the civil power to the ecclesiastical and of the ecclesiastical to the civil. They concur with Papus in holding the distinctness and independency of the Church and her supremacy in her own province. but they concur equally with the Erasteans in holding that the same independence and supremacy belong to the state within its province. They go to this length with both because the word of God requires it, but they go no further with either because the word of God forbids it. This scriptural Presbyterian principle has been generally and correctly described as involving a coordination of powers and a mutual subordination of persons. The coordination of powers just means the entire co-equality independence of the two powers, each being supreme in its province, and with reference to its own objects and functions. And the mutual subordination of persons means, first and more generally, that the same persons, if members of the Church, are subject to the civil power, and to that alone in all civil matters, and to the ecclesiastical office-bearers, and to them alone in ecclesiastical matters, insofar as any earthly authority is entitled to regulate them. And secondly, and more specifically, that civil rulers, if church members, are just as much subject to the control of ecclesiastical office-bearers in ecclesiastical matters as their subjects are, and that ecclesiastical office-bearers are just as fully subject to civil rulers in all civil things as any other members of the community. This is the scriptural Presbyterian principle, and it differs clearly and palpably in some most important respects from the common doctrine of papists. The Erastians have scarcely anything to allege in favor of the subordination of the ecclesiastical to the civil, except the cavil about an imperium in imperio in which the Papists agree with them and which we formally exposed. The Papists, in addition to this, plead in support of the subordination of the civil to the ecclesiastical the higher and more exalted character of the ends or objects to which the latter is directed. This affords no ground whatever for subordination in respect of authority or jurisdiction, while the equality of the two in this respect Their coordination, as opposed to subordination, is clearly involved in the views of them which are presented to us in the Scriptures. The leading Popish position, then, is unfounded and untrue. But we have at present to do chiefly with the applications which they make of this position, the consequences which they deduce from it. The position may be regarded generally as ascribing to the ecclesiastical power a right to exercise jurisdiction or authoritative control over the civil. In what then do the Papists regard this power of directing, correcting, and commanding which they ascribe to the ecclesiastical authorities in respect to the civil as consisting? First, it consists in this, that civil rulers are bound to be regulated in whatever they do in regard to religion, not directly by the word of God, or their own conscientious convictions of what is true or false, right or wrong, but by the decisions and orders of the Church. whereas Presbyterians hold that civil rulers have just the same liberty of conscience as ecclesiastical office-bearers, and are just as much entitled and bound to judge for themselves, and with a view to the regulation of their own conduct and the discharge of their own duty, what is true or false, right or wrong, without being under any obligation to be guided by the decisions or directions of the Church as such, irrespective of their accordance with the word of God. Of course, it is not contended that either civil or ecclesiastical rulers are entitled to form what judgments they please upon any matters of religion and to be guided merely by what they may sincerely and conscientiously believe. The word of God is the supreme and only standard by which all men, publicly and privately, collectively and individually, in a civil or in an ecclesiastical capacity, are bound to regulate their opinions and actions in all matters of religion and in all matters to which its statements may apply. This is an important truth which should never be overlooked. But what Presbyterians contend for is that civil rulers have the same independent right of judgment as ecclesiastical office-bearers, the same access to God's word, and are equally entitled and bound to judge for themselves as to its meaning and their consequent duty in matters of faith and practice. Civil rulers are entitled and bound to feel that, in all they may do in regard to religion and the Church, it is to God they are responsible. and it is by his word that they ought to be regulated. The Church of Rome no doubt professes to be guided by the word of God, but then she insists that civil rulers, in virtue of the alleged subordination of the civil to the ecclesiastical, shall, without personal investigation, at once take her decisions and her decrees as certainly true and righteous, and receive them as directly and immediately regulating the manner in which they are to act, or to exercise their civil power, their control over the persons and properties of men in everything pertaining to religion. The Popish doctrine makes the civil ruler the mere tool or servant of the Church, and represents him as bound implicitly to carry out the Church's objects, to execute her sentences, and to make everything subservient to the accompaniment of all her designs, while the Presbyterian doctrine represents civil rulers as holding immediately of God, entitled and bound to judge for themselves according to His word, and leaves to them fully and honestly the same liberty of conscience the same supreme and independent jurisdiction in their own province as the Church claims in hers. Presbyterians have been often charged with claiming the same authoritative control over the conscience and judgment of civil rulers as the Papists do, but the charge is utterly unfounded. Their principles do not require it, nay, do not admit of it, while the general principle of potpourri, as well as its special doctrine upon this subject, demand in consistency that they should put forth such a claim and exert themselves to the utmost to realize or enforce it. The true Presbyterian principle upon this subject is thus admirably stated by Gillespie in Aaron's Rod Blossoming. The civil sanction added to church government and discipline is a free and voluntary act of the magistrate. That is, church government doth not necessitate the magistrate to aid, assist, or corroborate the same by adding the strength of a law. But the magistrate is free in this, to do or not to do, to do more or to do less, as he will answer to God in his conscience. It is a cumulative act of favor done by the magistrate. The magistrate ought to add the civil sanction or he ought not to do it. It is either a duty or a sin. It is not indifferent. But my meaning is, the magistrate is free herein from all co-action, yea, from all necessity and obligation, other than ariseth from the word of God binding his conscience. There is no power on earth, civil or spiritual, to constrain him. The magistrate himself is his own judge on earth, how far he is to do any cumulative act of favor to the Church, which takes off that calamity that Presbyterial government doth force or compel the conscience of the magistrate. " The second conclusion which the Papists deduce from the general doctrine of the superiority of the ecclesiastical over the civil is that the Church, and especially the Pope as the head of it, has power, or a right of authoritative control, in temporal or civil matters, while Presbyterians, following out fully the principle of the independence and equality, or coordination and point of jurisdiction of the two powers, restrict equally civil and ecclesiastical rulers to their own sphere or province. Some Popish writers ascribe to the Pope direct supreme power in temporal things, holding him to be the Lord Paramount of the world, or at least of the Christian world, while others, among them whom is Bellarmine, deny to him direct and immediate jurisdiction in civil things, but ascribe to him an indirect authority in these matters, to be exercised which, as he is judge of when and how far the interests of religion may require him to interfere in secular matters, is just giving him as much of temporal power as he may find it convenient to claim. or may be able to enforce. Erastians have often asserted that Presbyterians claim some similar indirect power in temporal things, or over the proceedings of civil rulers, but the charge is wholly unfounded. For Presbyterians do not ask anything of civil rulers but what they undertake to prove that the Scripture requires of them, and what they are therefore bound to do, not as subordinate to the Church, but as subordinate to God's Word. And they do not pretend, as Papists do, that the sentences which the Church may be warranted to pronounce upon civil rulers when Church members, on the grounds of sin committed, affect their civil status or authority, their right to exercise civil power, and the obligation of their subjects to obey them. It is the doctrine of Presbyterians, as stated in our Confession, that infidelity or difference of religion does not make void the magistrate's just power. A principle which of course implies, and implies a fortiori, that no step which may be confident to the Church as such, and no sentence which the ecclesiastical authorities may pronounce, can tell authoritatively upon the relation and mutual duties of rulers and subjects, or upon the actual regulation of civil affairs. While the Church of Rome holds that in the subordination of the civil to the ecclesiastical, there is involved a right on the part of the Church, and especially if the Pope is the head of it, to make ecclesiastical sentences affecting the status and authority of civil rulers, the validity of civil laws, and the regulation of civil affairs. The third and last point in which the general doctrine of the Church of Rome upon this subject differs from that of Presbyterians is the claim set up by Papists on behalf of ecclesiastical office-bearers of exemption from the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil tribunals even in civil or temporal matters, that is, in questions affecting their persons or property. as the Erastian defenders of the supremacy of the Crown have generally held that the Church has no right to exercise ecclesiastical discipline upon the Sovereign, its temporal head, in like manner, and upon an analogous, though opposite, ground, the Papists claim that the persons and property of ecclesiastics should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts, but only to that of separate ecclesiastical tribunals. It is this claim, and this alone, which is intended to be denied in our confession of when, after speaking of the just power of magistrates not being made void by infidelity or difference of religion, it adds, from which ecclesiastical persons are not exempted. It is this exemption of the person and property of ecclesiastics from the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil tribunals that is commonly intended by Popish writers when they speak of ecclesiastical liberty or the freedom of the Church. And Presbyterians concur with all other Protestants in maintaining that this is a liberty or freedom which Christ has not conferred upon his Church, and which, when asserted as a right, runs counter to scriptural views of the authority and functions of civil rulers. Some of the more moderate papers have declined to ground this exemption upon a divine right or upon scriptural authority, and have represented it merely as a reasonable and proper concession made to the Church by the civil power. But most of them have held it to be necessarily involved in the general principle of the subordination of the civil to the ecclesiastical. and to have also directly and by itself special warrant in the word of God. While Presbyterians have fully and honestly carried out in this as in other respects their great scriptural principles of a coordination of powers and a mutual subordination of persons. It is right to mention that there are one or two incidents in the history of the contentions between King James and the Church of Scotland which have been represented, and not without as involving something like a claim upon the part of the Church to this popish exemption in civil matters from the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil tribunals. The allegation is merely plausible and cannot be fully established, though it may be admitted that some rash and unguarded statements were made upon the occasions referred to. That this is all that can be truly alleged has been shown by Dr. McRae's admirable life of Andrew Melville. In all these important respects, those which affect the foundations of the whole subject, there is a clear and palpable line of demarcation between Presbyterian and Popish doctrines in regard to the principles that ought to regulate the relation between the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities. And the common Erastian allegation of their identity is proved to be utterly unfounded in fact, and may not unfairly be regarded as unwarrantable as an unwarrantable attempt to create prejudice by misrepresentation. and to escape thereby from a fair discussion of the question upon its merits. The substance of this whole matter is this. Christ requires us to render to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's. Herastians violate the precept by giving to Caesar what is God's, God's in such a sense that Caesar has no authority and is entitled to no obedience in anything regarding it. Paithists violate this precept by taking from Caesar what rightfully belongs to him, under the pretense of giving to God what he himself has given to Caesar, though not to the exclusion of his own paramount control. While Presbyterians, i.e., all who have been deserving of the name, and have really understood their own professed principles, have fully obeyed it, in its letter and in its spirit, by ascribing to the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities their true character their due power, their legitimate jurisdiction, each in its own province, and by maintaining fully and faithfully the exclusive supremacy of God as the only Lord of the conscience, and of Jesus Christ as the only King and Head of the Church, while acknowledging the complete and absolute control of the civil power over the persons and property of all members of the community. We now turn to a selection from the works of George Gillespie. Published in 1642, we'll be reading from Volume 2, Chapter 13. Let no man here stumble in the threshold or be scandalized at the case I put. I intend nothing either against piety or truly pious persons, but to vindicate both from those principles of impiety which some maintain and adhere to under color of piety. There is that little truth and that pretense which diverse sectaries now make to the way of godliness. Observe but these principles of theirs. First, that none ought to be punished for preaching, printing, or maintaining any error in faith or religion, except to be contrary to the very light of nature. Hence it will follow that none is to be punished for preaching or publishing these errors, that the Scripture is not the word of God, that Jesus Christ was an imposter or deceiver, For the light of nature will never serve to confute these or such like errors concerning the Scriptures, the truths concerning them being wholly supernatural. Mr. J. Godwin holds that he who will hold that there is no Christ is not so pernicious nor punishable as that man who lives as if there were no Christ. And one of his reasons is this, because, saith he, the sins mentioned, adultery, theft, etc., are clearly and at first sight against the light and law of nature. But the denial of the being of such a person of Christ as Christ, who is both God and man, is not contrary to any law or principle in nature. " I desire that the reader may here observe the words of Mr. Burroughs in the epistle dedicatory of his sermon preached before the House of Peers November 26, 1645. For cannibus at blasphemies or damnable heresies, God forbid any should open his mouth. Those who are guilty herein against the light of nature should be taken off the face of the earth. and such as are guilty against supernatural light are to be refrained and kept from the society of men, that they infect not others." The latter part of that which he saith I accept, and I would to God that so much were put in execution. But why no other heretics or blasphemers should be taken off the face of the earth, but those only who are guilty against the light of nature, I find no reason brought for it, and I do not understand how it comes to pass that any who look so much forward to new lights should herein fall so far backward as to the light of nature, or that those who decline the light of nature in matter of church government, subordination, appeals, and the like, should notwithstanding in matters of faith, which are much more sublime, appeal to the light of nature." There is need of some Oedipus here. 2. That in controversies or questions of religion, so say the so-called pious persons, we must not argue from the Old Testament, but from the New. Hence are these exclamations against Old Testament spirits, etc., which might indeed beseem the Manichaeus, who denied and acknowledged not the Old Testament, but to be heard in a Reformed church. Among those who acknowledge the Old Testament to be the word of God as well as the new, it is most strange. Our orthodox Protestant writers condemn as well the Anabaptists, who reject and scorn at arguments brought against them from the Old Testament, as the Manichaeus, who did repudiate the Old Testament as having proceeded from an evil God. By this principle they shall not hold it contrary to the will of God under the New Testament, that a man marry his father's brother's wife. This not is forbidden in the New Testament, but in the Old. Some indeed of this time have maintained, it is not unlawful for us to marry within these degrees which are forbidden. See Mr. Edwards in his third part of his book, Gangrina, page 3. These hold it is only forbidden to commit fornication with such as are within these degrees, not being married, as if it were not unlawful to commit fornication with any, be they never so far without these degrees. By the same principle which rejects Old Testament proofs, they must deny the duty of children under the New Testament to marry with their parents' consent. And this is one of the foul errors of some sectaries nowadays, that Though consent of parents under children's marriages was commanded under the law to them that lived then, yet because that was but a ceremony, it is now lawful to marry without their consent, because we live under the gospel, so they say. See that same third part of Gangrena, page 14. By the same principle, they must deny that an oath, be it never so just and necessary, may be imposed by authority, or that the magistrate ought to put to death a blasphemer an incestuous person, an adulterer, a witch, or the like. The Scripture warrants which make these crimes capital being in the Old, but not in the New Testament. Sayeth not the Apostle, 2 Timothy 3.16, all Scripture, and consequently the lawful examples and laudable precedents of the Old Testament, is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness? Romans 15 verse 4, Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning. Is not our justification by faith proved by the example of Abraham's justification by faith? Romans 6, Doth not Christ himself defend his disciples plucking the ears of corn upon the sabbath day, by the example of David's eating the showbread, and by the example of the priest's killing of sacrifices upon the sabbath day? Yet those that most cry out against proofs from examples of the Old Testament are as ready as others to borrow proofs from there when they think to serve their turn thereby. For example, Arecius in the Anabaptists who would not admit proofs from examples of the Old Testament, yet many of them justify the Boer's bloody war by the example of the Israelites rising against Pharaoh. of the pretenses which diverse secretaries now make to the way of godliness is this, that if secretaries and heretics make a breach of peace, disturb the State, or do evil against the Commonwealth in civil things, then the magistrate may punish and suppress them. But secretaries and heretics who are otherwise peaceable in the State and subject to the laws and lawful power of the civil magistrate ought to be tolerated and See now how far this principle will reach. A man may deny and cry down the word of God, sacraments, ordinances, all the fundamentals of faith, all religious worship. One may have to leave to plead no church, no minister, no ordinances, yea, to blaspheme Jesus Christ and God himself, and yet escape the hand of the magistrate as being no troubler of the state. This I gather from Mr. Williams himself in his Bloody Tenet, Chapter 6, where he distinguishes between the spiritual and the civil peace. and clears in the instance of Ephesus, Now supposeth, saith he, that God remove the candlestick from Ephesus. Yea, though the whole worship of the city of Ephesus should be altered, yet, if men be true and honestly ingenuous to city covenants, combinations, and principles, all this might be without the least impeachment or infringement of the peace of the city of Ephesus. So that by their principles, so that by their principles, if the city of London was turning peaceably to Mohammedanism or paganism, the Parliament ought not to apply their power for reducing them. If this be not to care for men's own things, not for the things of Christ, what is? And must the magistrate purchase or hold them quit of the state at so dear a rate as the loss of many souls? What saith Mr. Williams himself in Bloody Tenet Chapter 33? It is a truth, the mischief of a blind Pharisee, blind guidance, is greater than if he acted treasonously, murderously, etc. And the loss of one's soul by his seduction is a greater mischief than if he blew up parliaments and cut the throats of kings or emperors so precious in that invaluable jewel of a soul. I wish this written in marble, or recorded upon the parliament walls, as the confession of one who has pleaded most for liberty and toleration from the magistrate to soul-murdering heretics and deceivers. SWRB makes thousands of classic Reformation resources available, free and for sale, in audio, video, and printed formats. It is likely that the sermon or book that you just listened to is also available on cassette or video, or as a printed book or booklet. Our many free resources, as well as our complete mail-order catalog, containing thousands of classic and contemporary Puritan and Reform books, tapes, and videos at great discounts, is on the web at www.swrb.com We can also be reached by email at swrb.com, by phone at 780-450-3730, by fax at 780-468-1096, or by mail at 4710-37A Edmonton, that's E-D-M-O-N-T-O-N, Alberta, abbreviated capital A, capital B, Canada, T6L3T5. You may also request a free printed catalog. And remember that John Calvin, in defending the Reformation's regulative principle of worship, or what is sometimes called the scriptural law of worship, commenting on the words of God, which I commanded them not, neither came into my heart, from his commentary on Jeremiah 731, writes, God here cuts off from men every occasion for making evasions, since he condemns by this one phrase, I have not commanded them, whatever the Jews devised. There is then no other argument needed to condemn superstitions than that they are not commanded by God. For when men allow themselves to worship God according to their own fancies, and attend not to His commands, they pervert true religion. And if this principle was adopted by the Papists, all those fictitious modes of worship in which they absurdly exercise themselves would fall to the ground. It is indeed a horrible thing for the Papists to seek to discharge their duties towards God by performing their own superstitions. There is an immense number of them, as it is well known, and as it manifestly appears. Were they to admit this principle, that we cannot rightly worship God except by obeying His word, they would be delivered from their deep abyss of error. The prophet's words, then, are very important, when he says that God had commanded no such thing, and that it never came to his mind, as though he had said that men assume too much wisdom when they devise what he never required, nay, what he never knew.